The EU-Turkey Customs Union: A model for Future Euro-Med Integration. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 9/March 2012 by Togan, Subidey
 This paper was produced in the context of the MEDPRO (Mediterranean Prospects) project, a 
three-year project funded under the Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities Programme of DG 
Research of the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Research Programme. MEDPRO 
Technical Reports give an indication of work being conducted within MEDPRO thematic Work 
Packages (WPs) and aim at stimulating reactions from other experts and academics in the field.  
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal 
capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated.  
ISBN-13: 978-94-6138-173-6 
Available for free downloading from the MEDPRO (www.medpro-foresight.eu) 
and CEPS (www.ceps.eu) websites 
© Copyright 2012, Sübidey Togan 
 
The EU-Turkey Customs Union:  
A Model for Future Euro-Med Integration 
Sübidey Togan 
MEDPRO Technical Report No. 9/March 2012 
Abstract 
This paper studying the 1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union (CU) reveals that the CU has been a major 
instrument of integration of the Turkish economy into the EU and global markets, offering powerful tools to 
reform the Turkish economy. Turkish producers of industrial goods are protected by tariffs from external 
competition to exactly the same extent as EU producers, and they face competition from duty-free imports of 
industrial goods from world-class pan-European firms. In return, Turkish industrial producers have duty-free 
market access to the European Economic Area, which was recently extended to certain Mediterranean 
countries. Trade liberalisation achieved through the CU has thus successfully moved the Turkish economy 
from a government-controlled regime to a market-based one, and Turkish producers of industrial goods have 
performed remarkably well. The paper further shows that market access conditions for Turkish producers are 
determined, in addition to tariffs, by standards, conformity assessment procedures, competition policy, 
industrial property rights and contingent protectionism measures. The CU also offered Turkey the 
opportunity to establish new institutions, and modernise and upgrade rules and disciplines required for the 
elimination of technical barriers to trade, and for the implementation of the EU’s competition, industrial 
property rights, and contingent protectionism policies. 
 
  
Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 
1.  Customs Union ...................................................................................................................... 1 
2.  Customs Reform .................................................................................................................... 4 
Modernisation Project............................................................................................................... 4 
Customs Code ............................................................................................................................ 6 
Customs Procedures ........................................................................................................... 6 
3.  Technical Barriers to Trade ................................................................................................... 7 
4.  Competition Policy .............................................................................................................. 10 
5.  Industrial Property Rights ................................................................................................... 12 
Enforcement and Implementation of Industrial Property Rights ............................................ 14 
6.  Administrative Procedures .................................................................................................. 15 
Contingency Trade Remedies .................................................................................................. 15 
Import Surveillance and Administration of Quotas ................................................................ 16 
7.  Public Procurement ............................................................................................................. 17 
8.  Administrative Costs of Implementing the Customs Union................................................ 18 
9.  Trade Performance, Foreign Direct Investment and Criticism of the Customs Union ....... 19 
Foreign Direct Investment ....................................................................................................... 20 
Criticism of the Customs Union .............................................................................................. 21 
10.  Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 21 
References ................................................................................................................................... 22 
 
 
 | 1 
The EU-Turkey Customs Union:  
A Model for Future Euro-Med Integration 
Sübidey Togan* 
MEDPRO Technical Report No. 9/March 2012 
Introduction 
After pursuing inward-oriented development strategies for 50 years, Turkey switched over to 
outward-oriented policies in 1980. The policy of further opening up the economy was pursued 
with the aim of integrating into the world economy through close association with the European 
Union. Turkey applied for associate membership in the EU – then the European Economic 
Community (EEC) – as early as 1959. The application ultimately resulted in the signing of the 
Association (Ankara) Agreement in 1963. The Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement 
was signed in 1970, and became effective in 1973. The basic aim of the Additional Protocol is 
the establishment of a customs union (CU). In 1995, it was agreed at the Association Council 
meeting that Turkey would create a CU between Turkey and the EU starting 1 January 1996.  
This paper, whose purpose is to study the EU-Turkey CU, is structured as follows. After 
discussing issues related to trade in industrial goods in section 1, section 2 covers customs 
reform, section 3 technical barriers to trade (TBTs), section 4 competition policy, section 5 
intellectual property rights, section 6 administrative procedures and section 7 government 
procurement. While section 8 reports estimates of the administrative costs of adopting and 
implementing the CU to Turkey, section 9 discusses trade performance, developments in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and problems faced by Turkey during the implementation of the CU. 
The final section offers conclusions. 
1. Customs Union 
A customs union (CU) is usually defined as a form of trade agreement under which certain 
countries preferentially grant tariff-free market access to each other’s imports and agree to apply 
a common set of external tariffs to imports from the rest of the world. In a CU, four sets of 
issues have to be settled between the parties: coverage of the CU, determination of the common 
customs tariff (CCT), collection of CCT revenue and allocation of CCT revenue. In the case of 
the Turkey-EU CU, the parties agreed from the onset that the CU should be restricted to 
industrial goods, that Turkey should accept the external tariff of the EU, that the CCT revenue 
would be collected by each party at the initial port of entry and that the CCT revenue would 
accrue as income to the party collecting that revenue.  
The Turkey-EU Customs Union Decision (CUD) of 1995 required Turkey to eliminate all 
customs duties, quantitative restrictions, all charges having equivalent effect to customs duties 
and all measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions in trade of industrial goods 
with the EU as of 1 January 1996. In addition, Turkey was required to adopt the CCT of the 
European Community (EC) against third-country imports by 1 January 1996 and also adopt all 
of the preferential agreements the EU has concluded and will conclude with third countries. As 
a result of these requirements, all industrial goods (except for products of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC)) complying with EC norms could circulate freely between 
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Turkey and the EU as of 1 January 1996. For ECSC products, Turkey signed a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with the EU in July 1996, and, as a result, ECSC products have received duty-
free treatment between the parties since 1999.1 When adopting the CCT of the EU, the 
‘sensitive products’ were initially excluded from the alignment. With the alignment of Turkish 
duty rates on ‘sensitive products’ with the CCT in 2001, Turkey has completed the alignment 
with the CCT. Furthermore, over time, Turkey has signed FTAs with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries, Israel, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Palestinian 
Authority, Tunisia, Morocco, Serbia, Syria, Egypt, Albania, Georgia, Montenegro, Jordan and 
Chile covering industrial goods.2 Finally, under Turkey’s Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP), based on the EC’s, preferences are granted to selected non-agricultural goods, including 
raw materials and semi-finished goods.  
Table 1 shows the nominal protection rates (NPR) that have prevailed during 1994 and 2001. 
The table reveals that prior to the formation of the CU the economy wide NPR during 1994 in 
trade with the EU has amounted to 10.2% when weighted by the sectoral import values. Among 
the 49 tradable goods industries of the 1990 Turkish input-output table there were three 
industries that had an NPR higher than 50% in trade with the EU, and 33 industries had an NPR 
less than 20%. In trade with the EU the highest NPRs were in the sectors of ‘fruits and 
vegetables’ (72.5%), ‘alcoholic beverages’ (72.1%) and ‘non-alcoholic beverages’ (56.9%). In 
the case of trade with third countries the average NPR has amounted to 22.1% when weighted 
by the sectoral import values. There were five industries which had an NPR higher than 50% in 
trade with third countries and 28 industries had an NPR less than 20%. During 1994 the highest 
NPRs in trade with third countries were in the sectors of ‘processed tobacco’ (99.9%), 
‘alcoholic beverages’ (94.3%) and ‘fruits and vegetables’ (72.6%).  
The table further reveals that with the formation of the CU the NPRs have decreased 
substantially in almost all sectors. The economy-wide NPR during 2001 in trade with the EU 
amounted to 1.3%. There was one industry (fruits and vegetables) that had an NPR higher than 
50%, nine industries had positive NPRs less than 50%, and for 39 industries the NPR was 0% in 
trade with the EU. In trade with the EU, the highest NPRs were in the sectors of ‘fruits and 
vegetables’ (68%), ‘fishery’ (47.8%) and ‘agriculture’ (41.3%). On the other hand, in the case 
of trade with third countries the average NPR has amounted to 6.9%. There was one industry 
(fruits and vegetables) which had an NPR higher than 50%, 13 industries had NPRs less than 50 
but more than 10%, and for three industries the NPR was 0% in trade with third countries. 
During 2001, the highest NPRs in trade with third countries were in the sectors of ‘fruit and 
vegetables’ (68%), ‘fishery’ (47.8%) and ‘agriculture’ (41.3%).  
While for the EU the average NPR has decreased from 10.2% in 1994 to 1.3% in 2001 with the 
formation of the CU, the average NPR for Israel and Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries decreased from 22.1% to 1.3%. For developing countries having GSP treatment the 
average NPR decreased from 22.1% in 1994 to 2.7% in 2001. Finally, for countries like the US, 
Japan and Canada, for which the EU applies the CCT, the average NPR has decreased from 
22.1% in 1994 to 6.9% in 2001. Thus, regarding access to Turkish market, we note that as a 
result of the formation of the CU almost all countries in the world have benefited from the 
reductions in NPRs in Turkey.  
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products are subject to special tariff arrangements.  
2 Negotiations are continuing with Lebanon, Faeroe Islands, South Africa and Mexico. 
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Regarding access of Turkish goods to the EU market, note that the EU had abolished the 
nominal tariff rates on imports of industrial goods from Turkey on 1 September 1971. However, 
at that time certain exceptions were made. The Community had retained the right to charge 
import duties on some oil products over a fixed quota and to implement a phased reduction of 
duties on imports of particular textile products. Trade of products within the province of the 
ECSC have been protected by the Community through the application of non-tariff barriers and 
in particular anti-dumping measures.  
The primary effect of a CU customs union is the expansion of trade flows among member 
countries, often at the expense of trade with non-members. This expansion is usually 
decomposed into trade creation and trade diversion. When trade diversion dominates trade 
creation, CUs tend to be welfare reducing. In the case of Turkey the CU has offered the 
opportunity to adopt a more liberal trade regime since the CCT is lower than pre-CU tariff. 
Thus, there was less potential for switching suppliers. As a result, the potential for trade 
diversion had been reversed. While domestic producers faced more competition from non-
members, the effect was offset by consumer gains resulting from lower prices and by tariff 
revenues collected on imports from non-members. 
Table 1: Nominal Protection Rates before and after the Customs Union with EU
I-O NPR with EU NPR with EU NPR with Third Average MFN Average Tariff
CODE SECTOR NAME in 1994 After Customs Countries in Tariff Rates Rates for GSP
Union 1994 after Customs Beneficiaries
Union after Customs
Union
1 Agriculture 41.27 41.26 41.65 41.26 41.26
2 Animal husbandry 3.48 1.37 4.18 1.37 1.37
3 Forestry 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.01
4 Fishery 47.92 47.84 54.08 47.84 47.84
5 Coal mining 3.33 0.00 3.33 4.00 0.00
6 Crude petroleum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 Iron ore mining 0.00 0.00 2.22 0.00 0.00
8 Other metalic ore mining 0.13 0.00 1.21 0.00 0.00
9 Non-metallic mining 9.09 0.00 11.02 0.95 0.95
10 Stone quarying 1.95 0.00 2.18 0.02 0.00
11 Slaughtering and meat 10.21 10.21 10.21 10.21 10.21
12 Fruits and vegetables 72.49 68.01 72.62 68.01 68.01
13 Vegetable and animal oil 16.31 16.31 16.38 16.29 16.29
14 Grain mill products 41.33 41.02 41.33 41.02 41.02
15 Sugar refining 28.79 28.79 28.79 28.79 28.79
16 Other food processing 26.47 18.31 28.99 18.31 18.31
17 Alcoholic beverages 72.10 5.25 94.28 11.28 7.35
18 Non-alcholic beverages 56.92 0.00 69.81 14.83 0.00
19 Processed tobacco 44.40 0.00 99.91 9.40 0.00
20 Ginning 0.00 0.00 2.22 0.72 0.72
21 Textiles 21.19 0.00 27.10 17.30 7.60
22 Clothing 14.75 0.00 20.65 19.90 9.30
23 Leather and fur production 7.85 0.00 12.57 10.20 2.80
24 Footwear 24.40 0.00 35.70 22.50 9.10
25 Wood products 15.25 0.00 18.97 2.00 0.05
26 Wood furniture 26.22 0.00 32.64 5.50 0.00
27 Paper and paper products 13.59 0.00 17.58 2.70 0.00
28 Printing and publishing 8.23 0.00 10.79 4.52 0.00
29 Fertilizers 8.22 0.00 16.38 8.10 0.00
30 Pharmaceutical production 3.33 0.00 8.99 5.30 0.00
31 Other chemical production 10.79 0.00 17.62 8.71 0.04
32 Petroleum refining 22.54 0.00 24.35 2.70 0.00
33 Petroleum and coal products 5.62 0.00 7.52 2.15 0.00
34 Rubber products 19.57 0.00 23.91 5.60 0.03
35 Plastic products 24.61 0.00 31.68 9.90 0.00
36 Glass and glass production 16.85 0.00 21.94 5.76 0.00
37 Cement 30.45 0.00 32.88 3.14 0.00
38 Non-metallic mineral 18.33 0.00 23.21 5.47 0.00
39 Iron and steel 8.00 0.00 10.70 5.50 3.30
40 Non-ferrous metals 4.52 0.00 8.43 3.20 0.50
41 Fabricated metal products 18.36 0.00 25.29 6.00 0.11
42 Non-electrical machinery 7.36 0.00 12.50 4.40 0.00
43 Agricultural machinery 6.98 0.00 12.18 3.50 0.00
44 Electrical machinery 9.69 0.00 16.64 8.30 0.00
45 Shipbuilding and repairing 6.13 0.00 12.89 0.50 0.00
46 Railroad equipment 0.00 0.00 4.61 4.04 0.00
47 Motor vehicles 27.33 0.00 33.10 9.40 0.00
48 Other transport equipment 0.01 0.00 1.76 1.60 0.00
49 Other manufacturing industries 2.92 0.00 8.19 2.95 0.00
MEAN 10.22 1.34 22.14 6.92 2.71
STANDARD DEVIATION 17.68 14.48 15.36 13.79 14.51
Source: Togan (1997).
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The CUD covering trade in industrial goods extends also to rules and disciplines on various 
regulatory border and behind-the-border policies.  
2. Customs Reform3 
The CUD requires Turkey to adopt EU customs provisions in the fields of i) origin of goods, ii) 
customs value of goods, iii) introduction of goods into the territory of the CU, iv) customs 
declarations, v) release for free circulation, vi) suspensive arrangements and customs procedures 
with economic impact, vii) movement of goods, viii) customs debt and ix) right of appeal. The  
Community’s Customs Code and its implementing provisions consist of the Combined 
Nomenclature, Common Customs Tariff and provisions on tariff classification, customs duty 
relief, duty suspensions and certain tariff quotas; and other provisions such as those on customs 
control of counterfeit and pirated goods, drugs precursors and cultural goods, mutual 
administrative assistance in customs matters, and Community agreements in the areas concerned 
including transit. Member states of the CU must ensure that the necessary implementing and 
enforcement capacities, including links to the relevant EU computerised customs systems, are in 
place. The customs services must also ensure adequate capacities to implement and enforce 
special rules laid down in related areas of the acquis, such as external trade.  
Modernisation Project4 
Efforts to establish a modern administrative structure in Turkey started prior to the CUD, but the 
main impetus has been the CUD. Prior to the formation of CU Turkey had quite a complicated 
import regime. The Turkish Customs Administration (TCA) was a traditional paper based 
customs organisation, and declarants had to go to customs offices to register declarations. Since 
at the customs almost all shipments had to be physically inspected, the process at the customs 
was very intrusive and time consuming. It often led traders to pay substantial facilitation money 
to speed up the process or to gain favour with customs officials in charge of their inspections.  
In 1995 Turkey signed a loan agreement with the World Bank in order to carry out a variety of 
institutional reforms to strengthen public financial management within the Government. The 
Modernisation of Turkish Customs is one of the components of this ‘Public Financial 
Management Project’. Besides, Turkey signed a technical assistance agreement with 
International Monetary Fund to provide international advisors to work in Turkey on a long-term 
basis with Turkish Customs.5 The aim of the Modernisation of Turkish Customs project was to 
speed up the release of goods, to collect customs duties and related charges in an effective way, 
to rationalise the clearance process and to simplify the procedures while enhancing customs 
control and creating and transferring statistical data in a timely and reliable manner. As a result 
the focus of the project was on i) modification of customs legislation according to the 
requirements of the CUD as well as to the requirements of international standards on customs 
developed by organisations such as the World Customs Organisation (WCO), ii) development 
and implementation of computer systems and iii) reorganisation of customs administration by 
creating a balance between customs control and trade facilitation and in harmony with other 
international agreements and conventions that Turkey was part of.6 
                                                     
3 I am grateful to Rıza Mehmet Korkmaz of the Under-Secretariat of Customs for his contribution to the 
paper. 
4 This sub-section is based partly on Togan (2010). 
5 During the period 2003-2009 Turkey received an additional total of €55.4 million from the EU for the 
modernisation of customs administration (see Togan (2010)).  
6 See Öktem (2004). 
THE EU-TURKEY CUSTOMS UNION: A MODEL FOR FUTURE EURO-MED INTEGRATION | 5 
The first phase of the automation project, the pilot implementation of BİLGE system, which is a 
system of custom formalities, started at Atatürk Airport in Istanbul, in August 1998. One year 
later in August 1999, traders at Atatürk Airport began using electronic data interchange (EDI) 
software supporting BİLGE. To date, almost all of the customs offices have been automated, 
and a very large percentage of all customs transactions are carried out electronically.  
In 2001 the project GÜMSİS (Security Systems for Customs Checkpoints) was launched with 
the objective of establishing watch and evaluation systems in customs collection district in order 
to prevent effectively illegal trafficking of goods, vehicles and people; to prevent false 
declaration of quantity and values of goods; and to facilitate legal trade. Under this project, X-
ray scanners and nuclear radiation detectors have been installed at several locations within the 
country. In 2003 a security system for customs borders was started with the aim of improving 
transit traffic based on a vehicle tracking system using license plate scanning. During 
subsequent years Turkey increased its use of X-ray devices, Closed Circuit TV systems, License 
Plate Scanners and Vehicle Tracking Systems, considerably helping to detect more drugs and 
smuggled goods over time. In 2004 a new project started on customs information technology 
(IT) systems the objective of which is the establishment of connection of BILGE with the 
Common Communication Network and Common System Interface (CCN/CSI) systems, 
National Customs Transit System (NCTS), Integrated Tariff of the European Communities 
(TARIC) and other related tariff systems with a view to harmonising the IT systems of TCA 
with the EU systems. 
The introduction of new technology changed the content of work in customs administrations. It 
reduced the need for the personal supervision of daily operations and resulted in a flatter 
organisation structure. As a result 120 customs offices with low efficiency were either merged 
or closed down. In addition, the total number of Regional Directorates in Turkish Customs was 
reduced from 36 to 18, and the functions of Regional Directorate of Customs and Directorate of 
Customs Enforcement have been merged in order to increase service efficiency in five Regional 
Directorates. Finally, greater authority was delegated to regional and local offices. 
One goal of the modernisation program was to refurbish and upgrade the physical condition of 
customs offices. Existing buildings needed to be adapted to meet work flow requirements and 
the use of information and communications technology (ICT). In a joint effort by the TCA and 
chambers of commerce and industry, the construction of modernised premises for the Kayseri, 
Gemlik and Konya customs offices was completed in 2001–2002. The Association of 
International Transporters built the customs facilities in Gürbulak, a border post with Iran, on 
the basis of a build-operate-transfer (BOT) model. On the other hand the Customs & Tourism 
Enterprises Co. Inc. (CTEC) of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey 
built five border posts on the basis of again BOT model. The facilities are providing 24 hour 
service, and at the border gates with Iran and Syria customs procedures of both countries are 
undertaken jointly. The objective is to eliminate the redundancies of formalities. With the 
improvement of physical standards, border waiting times have decreased by 60-70%. As of 
2010 the CTEC is planning to modernise an additional seven customs posts.  
Regarding human development the TCA launched major training and continuous education 
initiative to familiarise customs staff members with automated customs processing, with a 
special focus on training management staff members. Training facilities have been established 
in every Regional Directorate throughout the country to teach customs personnel and traders 
how to use the new customs software. In addition, TCA entered into contractual agreements 
with a number of experts – especially computer programmers, analysts and controllers – whose 
expertise was required to implement the reforms. The reform of the customs administration 
aimed also to increase the overall transparency of transaction processing by placing emphasis on 
the automatic processing of customs declarations, and thereby to stem corrupt practices and 
customs fraud. Regarding salaries of customs officers, note that the TCA has no flexibility in 
this matter as it has to comply with the general civil service regulations.  
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Modernisation of the TCA has been a challenging task. Initially, the TCA prepared a four-year 
action plan that presented in chronological order the various activities that it intended to 
undertake. A Reform Steering Committee, chaired by the deputy undersecretary of the TCA, 
was established to implement the program. But since committee members because of their daily 
duties and responsibilities could not pay full attention to the project, problems developed. In 
1997 a project unit staffed with customs employees was established to manage the reform and 
accelerate the decision making process. The deputy undersecretary was designated as the project 
coordinator who had the power and authority to make the changes required by the reform. 
Along with the project unit, a project team was formed to work on a full time basis. Thereafter, 
the project realised as foreseen in the time plan. 
One of the important challenges faced during the implementation of the project has been with 
‘communication’. Since uncertainty created by the reform increases the probability of resistance 
among the stakeholders who have an interest in either the process or the outcome, the 
administration found out that the reasons for the change as well as the benefits of the change 
needed to be communicated clearly to the stakeholders. In this regard, TCA prepared a 
“Strategic Statement” indicating the reasons and objectives of modernisation of the customs and 
passed this information to the stakeholders through a variety of ways ranging from written 
communications to small group meetings and large briefing sessions. Moreover, establishing a 
permanent Customs Consultative Committee involving different representatives from customs 
brokers and transport companies proved to be very helpful in providing participation to the 
modernisation project.7  
Customs Code 
Since the formation of the CU, Turkey has applied customs rules similar in substance to those 
contained in the EC’s Customs Code. The new Turkish Customs Law No 4458 replaced in 
February 2000 the previous Customs Law No 1615/1972, and with a Decree of 1995, the 
coding, tariff description, chapter, heading and sub-heading notes of the Turkish tariff 
nomenclature were aligned with the combined nomenclature of the EU.8 Recently, Law No 
4458 was amended with Law No 5911 of June 18, 2009, and the corresponding Implementing 
Regulation was published in October 2009. With the new Customs Law, Turkish Customs 
Legislation has been adjusted both to the international and the most recent EU standards.  
Customs Procedures 
Import transactions begin with the carrier’s submission of the cargo manifest of goods to be 
shipped in from abroad to a customs office. Traders when submitting their declarations 
electronically use their dedicated user codes and passwords and identify the final importer of the 
goods, attach the documents, and the harmonised system code for the goods declared.9 The 
cargo manifest and declaration data is entered into the Computerised Customs Management 
System (CCMS). At that stage, customs personnel match the number of packages of cargo with 
the number that is declared in the cargo manifest. Goods that are not to be cleared immediately 
                                                     
7 See Soysal (2001). 
8 Following Commission Regulation (EC) No 1031/2008 of 19 September 2008 amending Annex I to 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common 
Customs Tariff the Turkish nomenclature has recently been modified through Decision of the Council of 
Ministers No 2008/14483 of December 31, 2008. 
9 99% of the processes at the Turkish customs are conducted through computers via BILGE system. 
Article 60 of the Customs Law states in cases declarations are submitted in electronic form, documents 
which should normally be attached to the declaration will not have to be attached to the declaration, 
provided that they are submitted upon the demand of the customs authority. 
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are promptly moved to temporary storage places and warehouses. The computer system verifies 
the declaration and assesses the risk that the declaration may be faulty or erroneous. This 
verification may prompt customs staff to ask for additional documentation. The computer 
system calculates the duties due, informs declarants of the outcome of the risk analysis for their 
cargo and gives them a registration number. Goods are assigned different clearance channels: 
red for physical examination, yellow for documentary checks, blue for goods under post-release 
controls, or green for immediate release. The risk rating is performed in light of details 
previously entered by customs headquarters staff members into the customs computer system 
through a risk analysis module.  
As part of its trade facilitation work, the TCA sought to develop its ability to undertake its 
control function without having to open every single cargo shipment while retaining effective 
control over the flow of goods and duties payable.10 As emphasised by the WTO (2008) the 
TCA sought to achieve those goals by carefully selecting the shipments that would undergo 
physical inspection upon arrival and those that would be inspected after the goods had been 
released to traders. A specialised selectivity module in the CCMS was prepared by the Risk 
Analysis Unit. The module checks each declaration against pre-selected risk assessment criteria 
and assigns the shipments to the green, yellow, red, or blue channels. Companies cleared for 
simplified procedures use the blue channel for all imports. Customs staff members can modify 
the selectivity choices made by the CCMS, particularly by overruling yellow channel selections 
and orienting shipments toward the red channel so that they require full inspection before the 
release of the goods. 
3. Technical Barriers to Trade11 
Product standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment systems are essential 
ingredients of functioning modern economies. While a ‘standard’ is defined as a set of 
characteristics or quantities that describes features of a product, process, service or material, 
‘technical regulation’ is a mandatory requirement imposed by public authorities. Technical 
regulations and standards, despite many similarities, have different impacts. If a product does 
not fulfil the requirements of a technical regulation, it will not be allowed to be put on sale. In 
the case of standards, non-complying products will be allowed on the market but, then, the 
volume of sales may be affected if consumers prefer products that meet the standards.12  
The assurance of confidence in claimed standards requires that conformity assessment system 
comprised of testing, certification, metrology, accreditation and recognition is well functioning. 
Testing is the determination of the characteristics of a product, process or service, according to 
certain procedures, methodologies or requirements, the aim of which may be to check whether a 
product fulfils specifications such as safety requirements or characteristics relevant for 
commerce and trade. The extent of the controls that a product must undergo varies according to 
the risk attached to the use of the product. In low risk situations declaration by the manufacturer 
stating that certain standards have been applied to extensive testing and certification may be 
sufficient. In those cases tests are carried out by the manufacturer based on internal testing and 
quality assurance mechanisms, and the purchaser takes the manufacturer’s word that the product 
                                                     
10 Article 10 of the Customs Law No 5911 requires that customs controls, other than spot checks, shall be 
based on risk analysis using automated data processing techniques, with the purpose of identifying and 
quantifying the risks and developing the necessary measures to assess the risks, on the basis of criteria 
developed at national and, where available, international level. 
11 I am grateful to Mehmet Cömert, H. Murat Özturk and Didem Saygı of the Under-Secretariat for 
Foreign Trade for their constructive comments on and contributions to an earlier version of the paper. 
12 In the following we use the term ‘standards’ to refer to both mandatory requirements and voluntary 
specifications. 
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conforms. However, in more risky situations, the manufacturer’s declaration of conformity may 
not be sufficient. The use of independent laboratories may be required by the customer as a 
condition of sale or mandated by a regulatory agency. Alternatively, the purchaser may insist on 
formal verification by a third party that the product conforms to specific standards. In this case, 
certification is the procedure by which a third party gives written assurance that a product, 
process or service conforms to specified requirements.  
The two pre-requisites for properly conducting testing and certification are metrology and 
accreditation. The metrology institutions, ensuring the accuracy and precision of the 
measurements transmitted by the calibration laboratories to other conformity assessment bodies 
and enterprises, build confidence in the work of conformity assessment institutions. On the 
other hand, accreditation refers to the procedure by which an authoritative body gives formal 
recognition that a body responsible for conformity assessment is competent to carry out specific 
tasks. Many large manufacturers require their suppliers’ testing laboratories to be accredited as a 
condition for accepting suppliers’ products. Accreditation of a laboratory’s or certifier’s 
competence in a particular field typically involves a review of technical procedures, staff 
qualifications, product sample handling, test equipment calibration and maintenance, quality 
control, independence and financial stability. Finally, recognition is the evaluation of the 
competence of the accreditors.13 
The benefits of standards and conformity assessment systems include their facilitation of market 
transactions, raising the productive efficiency, enhancing market competition and contributing 
to the provision of public goods. While these functions apply across borders, they can also 
impose additional costs to exporters and hence act as barriers to trade. Technical barriers to 
trade (TBTs) are said to exist as long as countries impose different product standards as 
conditions for the entry, sale and use of commodities; as long as the different countries have 
different legal regulations on health, safety and environmental protection; and as long as 
different parties have dissimilar procedures for testing and certification to ensure conformity to 
existing regulations or standards. Technical barriers have two aspects: i) the content of norms 
(regulations and standards); and ii) testing procedures needed to demonstrate that a product 
complies with a norm. The TBTs thus come in two basic forms, content-of-norm TBTs and 
testing TBTs. In either case, the costs of the product design adaptations, the reorganisation of 
production systems and the multiple testing and certification needed by exporters can be high. 
These costs are on the one hand up-front and one-time and on the other hand on-going. While 
the up-front costs are associated with learning about the regulations and bringing the product 
into conformity with the regulations, the on-going costs are related to periodic testing. TBTs are 
said to distort trade when they raise the costs of foreign firms relative to those of domestic 
firms.14 
There are essentially two ways to eliminate TBTs: harmonisation and mutual recognition. The 
harmonisation approach has been pursued intensively by the EU among the member countries. 
For a new member country the elimination of TBTs in trade between this country and the EU 
requires i) harmonisation of the country’s technical legislation with that of the EU’s, ii) the 
establishment of quality infrastructure comparable to that in the EU, encompassing the operators 
and operation of standardisation, testing, certification, inspection, accreditation and metrology, 
and iii) the development of market surveillance and import control system as in the EU.15 On the 
other hand, under mutual recognition countries agree to recognise each other’s standards and 
conformity assessment procedures. But this approach based on mutual trust by the parties 
                                                     
13 See National Academy of Sciences (1995) and World Trade Organisation (2005). 
14 See Baldwin. (2001). 
15 See European Commission (2000) for a discussion of EU’s new approach to harmonisation. 
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requires as a minimum a relatively high degree of harmonisation of standards and test 
procedures. 
The CUD requires that Turkey incorporates within five years into its internal legal order the 
Community instruments relating to the removal of TBTs, and the list of these instruments is to 
be laid down within a period of one year. Furthermore, effective co-operation is to be achieved 
in the fields of standardisation, metrology and calibration, quality, accreditation, testing and 
certification. Thus, the CUD requires that Turkey adopts the harmonisation approach.  
Since the formation of the CU, Turkey has harmonised its standards to a very large extent with 
European and international standards and its technical legislation with that of the EU. But the 
harmonisation of technical legislation in the non-harmonised sphere has not been completed, 
limiting free movement of goods in the non-harmonised sphere. The establishment of the quality 
infrastructure was a lengthy and complex process, as Turkey, until the formation of the CU with 
the EU, had neither such an infrastructure nor the required technical knowledge. Establishing 
public awareness of the problem, acquiring the necessary knowledge and establishing the 
infrastructure took quite some time. But as of 2010, there is a relatively well functioning quality 
certification system in place in Turkey, comprising the Turkish Standards Institution (TSE), the 
Turkish Accreditation Body (TÜRKAK) and the National Metrology Institute (UME). A major 
difficulty faced during this period was getting the right to assign notified bodies that would be 
recognised by the EU.16 Turkey has received this right only by virtue of the Association Council 
Decision No 1/2006 of 2006. The development of a market surveillance and import control 
system, as in the EU, became even more challenging than establishing the quality infrastructure. 
Again, the reasons are various. A successful consumer product safety related market 
surveillance system requires independence, visibility, a uniform surveillance policy, a uniform 
enforcement policy, the integration of market surveillance and import controls, stronger regions, 
more acting power for inspectors and sufficient technical infrastructure.17 In addition, there were 
problems with the implementation of the import control system. As a result, the Turkish market 
surveillance and import control system until 2010 could not be developed as in the EU, and the 
continuation of these problems has adversely affected the elimination of TBTs in trade with the 
EU.18  
                                                     
16 The notified bodies are independent testing houses, laboratories, or product certifiers authorised by the 
EU member states to perform the conformity assessment tasks specified in directives. A notified body is 
designated by a member state and must have the necessary qualifications to meet the testing and/or 
certification requirements set forth in a directive. A notified body not only needs to be technically 
competent and capable of carrying out the specified conformity assessment procedures, but it must also 
demonstrate independence, impartiality and integrity. Conformance with the EN 45000/ISO 17000 
standards is mandatory. Where the directives delegate conformity assessment to third parties, these are 
notified by national authorities to the Commission and other member states under certain conditions. 
National authorities must be able to justify conformity of notified bodies through accreditation or other 
evidence. Certificates of conformity delivered by notified bodies must be accepted by all national 
authorities in the Union, and suppliers may choose any notified body in the Union. 
17 See Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade (2008b). 
18 The reasons for the non-elimination of TBTs between Turkey and the EU are various. First, the task 
itself is challenging. Second, the framework law and associated legislation, which is the basis for the 
work of harmonising the EU’s technical regulations, was put into effect only in January 2002, seven years 
after the formation of the CU. Thereafter, the adaptation process accelerated for both the new and 
classical approach regulations, and a large number of related regulations were adopted by Turkey. This 
time, however, Turkey faced another difficulty. There was no mechanism between Turkey and the EU 
similar to the one provided by the “EFTA Surveillance Body”, which evaluates the regulations prepared 
by the EFTA countries and ascertains the acceptability of these regulations by the EU. Since the EU-
Turkey Association Council did not establish a similar body, the regulations prepared by Turkey were not 
evaluated by such a body and there was no mechanism to approve these regulations. Third, the number of 
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4. Competition Policy19 
Prior to the formation of the CU, the Turkish government in order to promote investment in 
activities and areas regarded as desirable, has granted a number of incentives. The incentives, 
regulated by laws and decrees, have been directed on the one hand towards reducing the cost of 
investment, reducing the need for external financing and increasing profitability, and on the 
other, to increasing the competitiveness of Turkish exports. One of the purposes of the incentive 
schemes was to overcome the barriers to entry into industry imposed by capital market 
imperfections. But investment incentives have also been a barrier to competition and structural 
change. Through the incentive system, established firms obtained unit cost advantages which 
helped them to consolidate their market position. Entrants, competing scarce resources, have 
been at a disadvantage relative to well informed incumbents. Thus credit incentives, which were 
supposed to promote entry, have often turned into instruments that reinforced the position of 
large incumbents. Furthermore the government with its large share of the banking system has 
directly controlled the allocation of credit, and credit from public banks has often been extended 
not on the basis of commercial but of other considerations. In addition, the public sector 
procurements have contributed to increasing the barriers to competition as they generally lead to 
collusion among preferred suppliers. In Turkey, besides the barriers to entry there were also 
barriers to exit. Public firms were often not allowed to go bankrupt. In the case of private sector 
the government from time to time has not allowed the exit of firms of important sizes. In those 
cases overdue loans were often refinanced on a concessional basis by public sector banks. The 
government in order to protect the workers from unemployment subsidised the unprofitable 
public and sometimes the private firms. As a result, the exit barriers made firms more risk-
averse in undertaking new activities and blocked a more decisive approach to resource 
allocation. Finally, it should be noted that Turkey at that time did not have social safety net 
facilitating effective restructuring of the industry.  
Consideration of the concentration ratios across selected industrial products during 1989-90 
reveals that the ratios were relatively high prior to the formation of the CU. In addition, the 
public enterprise sector in Turkey was very large. The state had for a long time monopolies on 
tobacco, war weapons, railways, air-transportation, air and sea-port administration, post and 
telecommunication and sugar production, and in the manufacturing sector the state owned 
enterprises were heavily concentrated on basic metals, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, 
newsprint, paper, oil refineries, cement and textile production. The state-owned enterprises 
showed in general poor economic performance due mainly to the soft-budget constraint they 
faced. The state-owned enterprises, following objectives such as agricultural income support 
and employment creation influenced by political pressures, escaped the bankruptcy laws. 
Pricing, employment and investment decisions in those firms required in general the approval of 
Treasury, State Planning Organisation and sometimes ministers themselves. Although 
privatisation has become a prominent part of the Turkish structural adjustment program since 
1983, it could not gain momentum for a very long time due to various difficulties encountered.  
In Turkey there was for a very long time no specific competition legislation and thus no 
competition policy enforcement. During the 1980’s the country in order to promote competition 
has eliminated quantitative restrictions in foreign trade and decreased substantially the level of 
nominal and effective protection and subsidy rates. But the reduction of nominal and effective 
protection and subsidy rates was not sufficient to ensure proper functioning of the markets.  
                                                                                                                                                           
personnel in the responsible ministries and governmental bodies who were fluent in English and trained in 
matters related to TBTs was insufficient. Finally, financial resources were limited for the harmonisation 
of technical legislation.  
19 I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Nurettin Kaldırımcı and Yaşar Tekdemir of 
Competition Authority for their contributions to the study. 
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The CUD requires that Turkey adopts the EU competition rules, including measures regarding 
public aid within two years. Turkey had to ensure that its legislation in the field of competition 
rules is made comparable with that of the Community, and is applied effectively. In the EU the 
competition policy articles of the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (TFEU) 
are Articles 37 (State monopolies of a commercial character, ex Article 31 TEC), Articles 101 – 
105 (Rules applicable to undertakings, ex-Articles 81-85 TEC), Article 106 (Public 
undertakings and undertakings with special or exclusive rights, ex-Article 86 TEC) and Articles 
107-109 (Rules applicable to state aid, ex-Articles 87-89 TEC).20 The acquis covers both anti-
trust and state aid control policies. It includes rules and procedures to fight anti-competitive 
behaviour by companies such as restrictive agreements between undertakings and abuse of 
dominant position, to scrutinise mergers between undertakings and to prevent governments from 
granting state aid which distort competition in the internal market.  
Turkey adopted its competition policy during December 1994 with the “Law on the Protection 
of Competition”. The Competition Authority (CA) which has administrative and financial 
autonomy has been established in order to ensure the formation and development of markets for 
goods and services in a free and sound competitive environment, to observe the implementation 
of the Competition Law and to fulfil the duties assigned to it by the Law. During the period 
1999-2008 CA made 2570 merger, acquisition, joint venture and privatisation decisions. During 
the same period, 2662 cases were handled by the CA and 96.5% were resolved. Mergers and 
acquisitions represented 55.6% of cases resolved, followed by competition infringements 
(30.1%) and exemptions and negative clearance (14.3%). During 1999-2008 CA fined firms and 
managers for a total of 212 million TL for violation of corresponding legislation about 
competition. Thus, CA as emphasised by the World Trade Organisation (2008) has played an 
important role in moving the Turkish economy forward to greater reliance on competition-based 
and consumer-welfare oriented market mechanisms.  
According to European Commission’s Turkey Progress Reports and OECD (2005) Turkey has 
shown an appreciable progress in Anti-Trust issue. The CA proved itself to be a respectable 
organisation with satisfactory level of administrative and operational independence, 
emphasising on continuous staff training to supply high administrative capacity. The authority 
has a clear track record on implementation of the competition rules. It is the advisory institute 
for the actions of public enterprises granted by two circulars issued by Prime Ministry on 1998 
and 2001. All ministries have to receive the opinion of the CA about draft laws, by-laws, 
regulations and communiqués regarding issues that fall under the scope of Competition Law. 
CA issued opinions on the privatisation tenders of tobacco factories, ports and the Turkish 
Telecommunication Company.  
Article 34 of CUD bars Turkey and the EU member states from providing state resources to aid 
undertakings or economic sectors where doing so distorts or threatens to distort competition 
between the Community and Turkey, and under Article 39(2) of CUD, Turkey must adapt all of 
its existing aid schemes to EU standards and comply generally with the notification and 
guidelines procedures established by the EU to control aid by member states. Article 37 of CUD 
requires that Turkey adopt, within two years following the entry into force of the CU, the 
necessary EU rules for the implementation of the provisions relating to state aid. Despite these 
deadlines, the required rules have not been adopted until recently by Turkey. It was only in 
October 2010 that the law on state aid and subsidies was adopted by Parliament. The Law 
foresees the establishment of State Aid Monitoring and Supervisory Council along with a State 
Aid General Directorate for ensuring the effective application and enforcement of state aid rules 
under the CUD. 
                                                     
20 The TEC stands for the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 
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5. Industrial Property Rights21 
Until the formation of the EU-Turkey CU in 1995 matters related with industrial property rights 
were governed under a law dating back to the Ottoman Era (March 23, 1879). For a very long 
time patents have been issued without any warranty as to accuracy and novelty. Pursuant to Law 
No 6563 (May 21, 1955) government could forward patent requests to International Patent 
Institute in the Hague for search and verification by novelty. After the closing down of the 
International Patent Institute, Turkey has signed an agreement with European Patent 
Organisation in 1977 and a protocol with the Austrian Patent Office in 1992. As a result of these 
agreements patent request made in Turkey could be sent to these institutions for search and 
verification by novelty. Patent requests had to be filed with Industrial Property Department, 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce and patent could be requested for five, ten or fifteen years. 
Pharmaceutical formulae, industrial designs and models and financial schemes could not be 
patented. Turkey was a signatory to London and Stockholm text (with exception of first 12 
articles) signed in 1934 and 1967 and to the Paris Agreement of 1883 on ‘Protection of 
Industrial Property’. Patent infringements could give rise to civil action, as well as, to criminal 
prosecution. On the other hand trademarks were governed for a long time by Regulation on 
Trademarks of Commercial Products of 1871, and later on by Law No 551 dated March 3, 1965 
and by the related instructions issued by Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Trademark had to 
be filed with Ministry of Industry and Commerce. No right of action against infringement 
existed until such filing took place. Foreigners could file their trademarks in Turkey. Trademark 
was registered for 10 years and could be renewed as often as desired. Trademark infringements 
could also give rise to civil action and criminal prosecution: 
Turkish legislation on industrial property rights had a few shortcomings. The Turkish Patent 
Law specified that patents would be available for any inventions, provided they were new and 
were capable of industrial application. Thus, the law did not include the requirement that the 
invention involves an inventive step. Patents have been issued without any examination, and the 
burden of proof has been with the applicant. But after the adoption of Law 6563 of May 21, 
1955 Turkey moved towards a system with examination. Under the patent system that prevailed 
until 1995 the administration, when Turkish citizens have applied for patents, has asked the 
universities for their opinion on patentability. Since the universities in Turkey did not have the 
necessary infrastructure for the study and verification by novelty, the opinions expressed by 
faculty members have sometimes been biased. Therefore the domestic investors were not 
willing to invest in new inventions as they were afraid that the patent protection could be 
waived after some time. The government has forwarded the patent requests of foreigners to 
European Patent Offices for study and verification by novelty. Thus in the case of applications 
by foreigners there was no chance that the patent protection would be waived after some time. 
As such, the system was considered to be biased against Turkish citizens. Although patent 
infringements until 1995 could give rise to civil action, as well as, to criminal prosecution, there 
were no ‘special courts’ assigned with the settlement of disputes over the protection of industrial 
property rights. The legal system in Turkey faced various difficulties when studying and 
evaluating the different dispute issues, and the settlement of disputes took in general long time.  
                                                     
21 Intellectual property is usually defined as information with a commercial value. The main legal 
instruments utilised to protect intellectual property rights are patents, copyright, industrial designs, 
geographical indications and trademarks. Special forms of protection have also emerged to address the 
needs in the cases of plant breeders, layout-designs and integrated circuits. Although all of these 
instruments form the national system of intellectual property rights, we consider in the following only the 
industrial property rights. Herewith I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Habip Asan, Salih 
Bektaş, Nur Güları, and Kadri Yavuz Özbay of the Turkish Patent Institute for their contributions to the 
study. The sub-section is based to a large extent on Togan (2010c). 
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Article 31 and Annex 8 of the CUD require that Turkey insures adequate and effective 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and that it will implement the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on ‘Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS) 
by 1999. Furthermore Turkey will have to adopt by January 1, 1999 legislation to secure the 
patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes. In addition Turkey had to accede to 
various international conventions.  
In the field of industrial property rights, the acquis sets out harmonised rules for the legal 
protection of trademarks and designs, as well as a harmonised regime for patents. These include 
conditions for compulsory patent licensing. An important element of the EU-wide patent system 
is the participation to the European Patent Convention and European Patent Organisation. Other 
specific provisions apply for biotechnological inventions, pharmaceuticals and plant protection 
products. The acquis also establishes a common playground for the protection of industrial 
designs, a Community trademark and Community design system. Moreover provisions exist 
concerning supplementary protection certificates, which serve to provide inventors with 
additional protection, when they could not benefit from the protection of a patent, for the entire 
period for which the patent was granted. The Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of 
intellectual and industrial property rights such as trademarks, designs or patents requires all 
member states to apply effective, dissuasive and proportionate remedies and penalties against 
those engaged in counterfeiting of goods and piracy and so create a level playing field for right 
holders in the EU. Customs Administrations play an important role to prevent the circulation of 
products infringing industrial property. 
To satisfy the requirements of the CUD Turkey since 1995 has been making substantive efforts 
to align its legislation with the acquis. The ‘Turkish Patent Institute’ (TPI) was established in 
1994. It is the main administrative body responsible for granting patents, utility models, 
registering designs, dealing with trademarks, circuits' topographies and geographical 
indications. The new Turkish Patent Law became effective in 1995, and in 2003 the Legislation 
on the Establishment and the Functions of TPI was promulgated.22 By 2010 Turkey is a party to 
the Convention establishing World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) since 1976, Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property since 1995, Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1995, Patent Cooperation Treaty since 1996, Nice 
Agreement concerning International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purpose of 
Registration of Marks since 1996, Vienna Agreement concerning International Classification of 
the Figurative Elements of Marks since 1996, Strasbourg Agreement concerning the 
International Patent Classification since 1996, Budapest Agreement of the International 
Registration of the Deposit of Micro-Organisms for the Purpose of Patent Procedure since 1998, 
Locarno Agreement establishing an International Classification for Industrial Design since 
1998, Protocol relating to Madrid Agreement since 1999, European Patent Convention since 
2000, Hague Agreement concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Design (Geneva Act) 
since 2005, Trademark Law Treaty since 2005, and International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention) since 2007.  
The patents granted in Turkey provide rights only within Turkey. If an applicant wants to obtain 
patent rights in other countries, he/she may file applications in each country separately or he/she 
may apply through Patent Co-operation Treaty or through European Patent Convention. In the 
case of the European patent the process goes through the usual stages of filing, search, 
publication of the application and substantive examination. Once the European patent is granted, 
the patent has to be validated in each of the designated states within a specified time limit to 
retain its protective effect and be enforceable against infringers. Thus, the process is quite 
complex, lengthy and considerably costly.  
                                                     
22 The Decree-Law No 551 was amended by Decree No 566 of September 1995, Law No 4128 of 7 
November 1995 and Law No 5194 of 22 June  2004.  
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The Turkish legislation on trademarks consists of the Decree 556 of 1995 and the implementing 
regulation.23 On the other hand, the provisions concerning industrial designs are contained in 
Decree Law 554 on the Protection of Designs and the Implementing Regulation, both of 1995.24  
Enforcement and Implementation of Industrial Property Rights 
In any country the enforcement and implementation of industrial property rights is a challenging 
task.25 Defending of such rights and enforcing of these rights requires different skills. There is 
need for special courts for the settlements of disputes and for efficient services of public 
prosecutors, judges, patent attorneys and police. Regarding special courts it should be 
emphasised that specialist judges with experience in patent and other intellectual property 
matters are essential in order to deliver reliable and predictable decisions on questions of 
infringement and validity as well as on damages payable by infringers. Similar considerations 
hold also for public prosecutors and police. Regarding patent attorneys it is emphasised that 
they must have profound knowledge of natural sciences and the ability to put new technical 
concepts or developments into word. While they are expected to be knowledgeable in a 
restricted area of law they must have deep knowledge in their field of legal practice which may 
include domestic and international laws and national laws of other countries. The patent 
attorney's most important role is to apply his/her specialised legal and scientific knowledge to a 
new technical solution and by properly wording a patent specification and patent claims to lay 
the foundation for a new industrial property right. The patent attorney is also expected to 
provide advice on know-how licenses, including drafting license agreements or providing 
advice on the rights of employed inventors and advising clients on technical developments.  
In Turkey, right holders whose rights have been infringed may take action to protect their rights 
through civil and criminal procedures against the infringer. Civil procedures include action for 
cessation of infringement and prevention of possible infringement, as well as measures for 
compensation of moral and material damages, including indemnities and appropriation of unfair 
profits made by the infringer. The judicial infrastructure in enforcement of intellectual property 
rights are courts, offices of public prosecutor and Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice is 
responsible for the establishment of intellectual property rights courts, ensuring effective 
operation of these courts and training judges, public prosecutors and other staff working in these 
courts. Turkey has 23 specialised intellectual property rights courts (seven civil and seven 
criminal courts in Istanbul, four civil and two criminal courts in Ankara and one civil and two 
criminal courts in Izmir). In parts of Turkey where there are no specialised courts, ordinary 
ones, designated by the Supreme Board of Judges and Public Prosecutors, can rule on 
                                                     
23 The Decree which is in harmony with Council Directive No 89/104/EEC has been amended on 3 
November 1995 and on 22 June  2004. 
24 The Decree is in harmony with Council Directive 98/71/EEC. 
25 In Europe patents are enforced both civilly and/or administratively. While there are international 
agreements, such as the TRIPS Agreement, the EU has its own ‘Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights Directive’ (2004/48/EC). Under the Directive enforcement is a Member State issue, and Member 
States must provide measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights that are fair and equitable. All EU member States must provide effective, 
dissuasive, and proportionate remedies and penalties against those engaged in counterfeiting and piracy. 
As a result many states have adopted national provisions on civil remedies more closely in line with ‘best 
practices’ standards, which include procedural protection covering evidence and protection of evidence, 
and provisional measures such as injunctions and seizure. There is also a right of information that allows 
judges to gain access to names and addresses of those involved in distributing the illegal goods, and the 
details about the amount of goods involved and the prices. Remedies include the destruction of infringing 
products, recall of illegal material, and permanent removal of the products from the EU market. The 
legitimate patent holder may be entitled to damages and/or injunctive relief.  
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intellectual property rights cases, and as of June 2006 a Court of Appeal has been established 
for these cases. Enforcement authorities include police, municipal police and gendarmerie. In 
cases of industrial property rights violations criminal proceedings start upon complaint. Police 
has already established an intellectual property rights office within its General Directorate. In 
general financial crimes sections of the police and gendarmerie anti-smuggling and organised 
crimes departments are authorised to handle related cases.  
Turkey similar to the EU member states must provide measures, procedures and remedies 
necessary to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights that are fair and equitable. 
But this is not an easy task. Establishing the enforcement mechanism took quite some time. The 
task as of 2010 is still not complete. Although a relatively large number of judges, lawyers, staff 
in enforcement bodies, police forces and customs officers were trained in intellectual property 
rights related issues, the number of trained personnel is still insufficient, and training of the 
personnel needs to be strengthened. It is also emphasised that the appeal stage of the intellectual 
property rights court procedures turned out to be also very lengthy, and the coordination and 
cooperation between relevant bodies i.e. the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, the police, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Under-Secretariat for Customs and municipalities to be weak.26 
6. Administrative Procedures 
The CUD requires that Turkey approximates and implements EU’s commercial policy 
regulations including procedures for anti-dumping rules, administering quantitative quotas and 
procedures for officially supported export credits.  
Contingency Trade Remedies 
Article 44 of the CUD of 1995 specifies that as long as a particular practice is incompatible with 
the competition rules of the CU as specified in Articles 32-38 of the CUD and ‘in the absence of 
such rules if such practice causes or threatens to cause serious prejudice to the interest of the 
other Party or material injury to its domestic industry’ the Community or Turkey may take 
appropriate measures. Article 44 allows anti-dumping actions as long as Turkey fails to 
implement effectively the competition rules of the CU and other relevant parts of the acquis 
communautaire. In those cases, Article 47 of the Additional Protocol signed in 1970 between 
Turkey and EC remain in force. According to this article, if the Association Council finds 
dumping, it shall address recommendations to the persons with whom such practices originate. 
The injured party may take suitable measures if i) the Council has taken no decision within three 
months and ii) the dumping practices continue. In the case of need for immediate action, the 
party may introduce an interim protection measure such as anti-dumping duties for a limited 
duration. But the Council may recommend the abolition of these interim measures. Finally, 
Article 63 is about safeguards and states that safeguard measures specified in Article 60 of the 
Additional Protocol will remain valid. According to Article 60, the Community (Turkey) may 
take necessary protective measures if serious disturbances occur in a sector of the economy of 
the Community (Turkey) or prejudice the external financial stability of one or more member 
states (Turkey), or if difficulties arise which adversely affect the economic situation in a region 
of the Community (Turkey).  
The first Turkish legislation on anti-dumping and countervailing measures, namely Law 
No 3577 of 1989 on Prevention of Unfair Competition in Importation including the related 
                                                     
26 See the various issues raised by the European Commission’s Turkey Progress Reports. Lately, efforts 
were made to increase the coordination between various government departments. In particular, the 
circular on the formation of the Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights Coordination Board was 
published in the Official Gazette, 21 May 2008, No 26882. 
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Decree and Regulation, was published in 1989. But this legislation was not in conformity with 
the CUD obligations. As a result, the Law No 4412 Amending Law No 3577 on the ‘Prevention 
of Unfair Competition in Imports’ was enacted in 1999. Additional rules were ratified by the 
Decree No 23861 on the ‘Prevention of Unfair Competition in Imports’, published in 1999; and 
the Regulation No 23861 published also in 1999.27 On the other hand Turkey has promulgated 
new legislation on safeguard measures with Decree No 735/2004 published in 2004 and the 
Regulation on Safeguard Measures for Imports published also in 2004. The legislation aims to 
ensure conformity with the CUD obligations.28  
Import Surveillance and Administration of Quotas,  
As a requirement for harmonisation of its import policy with that of the EU Turkey introduced 
import quotas on certain textile and clothing products. The quotas were introduced on 
1 January 1996 under Article XXIV of GATT 1994. Within the context of the legislation on 
‘Surveillance and Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Textiles Products’, the 
management of quotas and surveillance has been realised under a double checking system for 
imports from countries with which an agreement has been reached, and a single-checking 
system has been applied to textile and clothing imports from countries with which no agreement 
has yet been reached. Turkey did not auction its quotas, which would have transferred the 
economic ‘rent’ gained by the quota holders to the Government as public revenues. Instead, the 
larger part of the quotas was distributed among firms that had imported the same category in the 
previous year. The remaining quotas were allocated to firms that did not previously import that 
category of goods. The quota allocation license could not be sold or transferred. Turkey has also 
introduced quotas for imports of some products originating from China. These goods included 
footwear, tableware and kitchenware of porcelain or china, ceramic tableware or kitchenware 
and toys. The legislation applied to imports from China also applies to imports from some other 
non-member countries of the WTO. Currently, quotas and tariff-quotas are administered via 
Decision 2004/7333 of 19 May 2004 and the related implementing regulation. Information on 
the quotas are published in the Official Gazette. As in the EU import licenses are required for 
products subject to quantitative restrictions, safeguard measures or for import monitoring and 
surveillance.29  
As emphasised by WTO (2008) Turkey is applying quotas to textile and clothing products from 
Belarus under the double-checking system and to goods from the Democratic People's Republic 
                                                     
27 In the EU the anti-dumping regulation is based on Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, the anti-
subsidy rules on Council Regulation (EC) No 1973/2002 and Council Regulation (EC) No 461/2004. The 
regulations comply with the EU's international obligations, in particular the WTO Agreement on the 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Anti-Dumping Agreement) 
and WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The Turkish legislation on anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy is consistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as well as with the relevant EU regulations.  
28 In the EU the safeguard measures are based on Council Regulation (EC) No 260/2009, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 625/2009 and Council Regulation (EC) No 427/2003. The regulations comply with 
the EU's international obligations, in particular the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. The Turkish 
legislation on safeguards is consistent with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards as well as with the 
relevant EU regulations 
29 Import licenses are issued on the basis of four methods. Under the first method licenses are distributed 
among firms that had imported the same category in the previous year, and the remaining quotas are 
allocated to firms that did not previously import that category of goods. Under the second method quotas 
are allocated equally among applicants ordered according their application dates. Third method involves 
the allocation of quotas according to demands by the applicants. Finally, the last method is determined by 
the Under-Secretariat for Foreign Trade. The import licenses are not transferable, and they constitute an 
authorisation and have a fixed period of validity.  
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of Korea, Montenegro and Uzbekistan under the single checking system. It also applies 
surveillance measures to imports from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan under the single checking 
system. Moreover, Turkey has quotas for 44 categories of textiles and apparel products from 
China, such as shirts, jerseys, T-shirts and gloves. According to the authorities, these quotas are 
applied under paragraph 242 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China to 
the WTO, which sets a safeguard mechanism for imports of textiles and apparel products 
originating in China.  
Import surveillance in Turkey applies to certain textiles, steel products and to agricultural 
products including cereals, rice, sugar, olive oil and table olives, milk products, beef and veal, 
fresh fruit and vegetables, processed fruit and vegetables, bananas and ethyl alcohol of 
agricultural origin. These products are subject to automatic licenses for statistical purposes and 
for improving control of the origin of the products. On the other hand, tariff preferences on 
agricultural products, granted under Turkey's trade agreements, are generally subject to quotas. 
Tariff quotas are applied on imports of various agricultural and processed agricultural products 
from the EU, Israel, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt 
and Albania.  
7. Public Procurement 
During the Ottoman period public procurement was regulated by Public Procurement 
Regulation of 1857. In 1914, an additional regulation was published on public works. The first 
law regulating public procurements in the Turkish Republic was the Law on Auctions, Disputes 
and Importing No 661 of 1925. With few amendments, this law stayed in effect until 1934. In 
1934 a new law, namely ‘Law on Auctions, Competitive Bidding and Auctioning’ No 2490 was 
enacted, which remained in force for nearly 50 years.  
In 1983 the Law on Public Procurement No 2886 was enacted and thereafter for a relatively 
long time the legal framework of the Turkish public procurement system consisted of this law, 
which was amended by Law No 2990 of 1984 and of associated decrees and regulations. The 
Law was covering the general budget institutions, annex budget institutions, local 
administrations and the municipalities. State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and some 
autonomous administrations were excluded from the scope of the Law. These administrations 
put into force their own arrangements parallel to the Law on Public Procurement. In the 
implementation of this Law the main principle was to meet the requirements under the most 
favourable and suitable conditions and in due time. Achieving a competitive solution was not 
the main objective. Although the Law specified different tendering systems such as open 
tenders, restricted tenders and negotiated tenders, preference was given to the close envelop 
system. The tenders were announced in the newspapers. Moreover, tenders with estimated 
amounts above certain threshold levels had to have an appropriation in the budget regarding the 
particular tender. Furthermore, they had to be published in the Official Gazette.30 
The Law No 2886 had quite a few shortcomings. It was emphasised that the Law was falling 
short of following the developments in international public procurement practices, that it was 
not transparent enough, that there were weaknesses in the auditing system, that publication of 
procurement notices was not mandatory and that procurement results were not made public. 
Since a large number of public institutions remained outside the scope of the Law 2886, and 
since each of these institution could issue its own regulations on procurements with the approval 
of the Cabinet, public procurement procedures followed by different institutions differed 
considerably leading to confusion in the Turkish public procurement system. In addition, the 
                                                     
30 See World Bank (2001), Public Procurement Authority (2002) and Secretariat General for EU Affairs 
(2001). 
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carnet system used by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlements lead to increased 
corruption. In short, the system was not open, transparent and non-discriminatory. 
Article 48 of the CUD states that the Association Council will set a date for the initiation of 
negotiations aiming at the mutual opening of the Parties’ respective government procurement 
markets as soon as possible after the date of entry into force of the CUD. But this rather vague 
statement in the CUD was interpreted by the parties as if Turkey did not have any obligations 
arising from CUD in the area of public procurement. As a result, no reform was undertaken in 
the public procurement area as a requirement of the CUD.31 The reform process started only 
after the European Council decided to start membership talks with Turkey on October 3, 2005. 
8. Administrative Costs of Implementing the Customs Union32 
To estimate the budgetary cost of assuming the obligations of the CU we use quite detailed 
budget figures of the different public institutions. While most of the budget figures of these 
institutions were obtained from the Ministry of Finance for the period 1994-2009, expenditure 
data for institutions such as TÜRKAK, the Competition Authority, the Turkish Patent Institute 
and National Metrology Institute (UME) were obtained from the relevant institutions.33 The data 
were aggregated under the headings of personnel expenditures, current expenditures and 
investment expenditures. Since the figures were given in nominal terms, we use the GDP 
deflator (price index) to convert all figures to 2009 prices. Next we use the average Turkish 
lira/euro exchange rate of 2009 to obtain the figures in terms of 2009 euros.  
Some of the institutions such as Under-Secretariat for Foreign Trade, Under-Secretariat of 
Customs and the Turkish Standards Institute were operating before the start of CU, and they 
were employing a large number of personnel. The CU put pressure on these institutions to 
employ additional staff as well as to train the staff in issues related to relevant acquis. In 
addition they had to increase the investment expenditures. As a result, when considering the 
budgetary cost of assuming the obligations of the CU for these institutions we concentrate on 
their total expenditures consisting of personnel expenditures, current expenditures and 
investment expenditures. Noting that during the period 1990-2009 Turkish real GDP has 
increased at the annual rate of 3.9%, we assume that total real expenditures of these institutions 
would have increased at the same annual growth rate as that of real GDP, if the CU had not been 
implemented. The excess of actual to predicted expenditures by these institutions over the 
period 1996-2009 is then considered to be the budgetary cost of assuming the obligations of the 
CU for these institutions.  
On the other hand, institutions such as TÜRKAK, Competition Authority, the Turkish Patent 
Institute and National Metrology Institute were established either around 1995 or thereafter as a 
result of the requirements of the CU. After the establishment of these institutions they had to 
increase their personnel expenditures and investment expenditures considerably in order to meet 
the demand for additional personnel, train their personnel and also build the required 
infrastructure. As a result, when estimating the budgetary cost of assuming the obligations of the 
CU in the case of these institutions we consider the total expenditures consisting again of 
personnel, current and investment expenditures over a period of five years after their 
establishment.  
                                                     
31 The reform process started after the European Council decided to start membership talks with Turkey 
on 3 October 2005. 
32 This section is based largely on information contained in Togan (2010). 
33 I am grateful to Dr. Ahmet Kesik and Ali Mercan Aydin of the Ministry of Finance for providing the 
data, and to Ertan Tok for excellent research assistance. I would like to thank Atakan Baştürk of 
TÜRKAK and Özcan Kuşbabalı of TSE for providing the data for TÜRKAK and TSE respectively. 
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In some cases certain institutions such as the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Justice were 
involved in implementing the requirements of the CU as in the case of implementation of 
intellectual property rights, and in those cases it was not possible to derive from the budget data 
of the related institutions the costs related with fulfilling the requirements of the CU. In those 
cases we have taken the cost figures of the relevant institutions from the studies of the 
Secretariat General of EU Affairs (2001, 2003 and 2007).  
Finally, we have added to the sum of the above figures the funding received from the EU (EU 
contribution), since these figures were not included in the budget figures.  
Table 2 shows that the estimated costs of assuming the obligations of the CU has amounted to 
€1,065.1  million, and that the share of EU contribution in total cost of assuming the obligations 
of the CU has amounted to 8.83%. 
 
 
 
9. Trade Performance, Foreign Direct Investment and Criticism of the Customs 
Union 
Table 3 shows the developments in Turkish trade prior to and after the formation of the CU. In 
1995 Turkish exports to EU-15 amounted to $11.1 billion (51.2% of Turkey’s exports); while 
imports from the EU-15 amounted to $16.9 billion (47.2% of Turkey’s imports).34 With the 
formation of the CU the share of imports from the EU-15 in total imports went up from 47.2% 
in 1995 to 53% in 1996, but then started to decrease reaching 31.2% in 2008. Comparison of the 
growth rate of imports from the EU-15 prior to the formation of the CU with those observed 
after the formation of the CU reveals that the average growth rate of imports from the EU-15 
has declined from 9.2% experienced during 1990-1995 to -3.1% during the period 1996-2001, 
but thereafter picked up and increased to 15.6% over the period 2002-2008. On the other hand 
the effect of the CU on exports seems also to be of limited importance initially. Whereas the 
annual average growth rate of exports to the EU-15 was 7.5% prior to the formation of the CU, 
it had declined to 6.4% over the period 1996-2001, but increased thereafter to 17% over the 
period 2002-2008. Similarly the share of exports to the EU-15 in total exports increased from 
51.2% in 1995 to 54% in 1999, but thereafter the share declined to 51.2% in 2002 and further to 
39.2 in 2008.  
                                                     
34 Although Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995; Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia on 1 May 2004; and Bulgaria 
and Romania on 1 January 2007, we consider in the following for reasons of consistency data for EU-15 
consisting of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom over the entire period 1990-2009. 
Table 2: Costs of Assuming the Obligations of the Customs Union
Share of
Cost EU Contribution EU Contribution
Million Euros Million Euros (percent)
Industrial Goods 536.4 29.9 5.57
Customs 77.6 55.4 71.32
Industrial Property Rights 61.5 8.8 14.36
Competition Policy 389.6 - 0.00
TOTAL 1,065.1 94.1 8.83
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The above considerations reveal that the formation of the CU between Turkey and the EU lead 
to increases in exports to the EU only after an adjustment period of almost five years. Similar 
considerations hold also for imports from the EU. The reasons may be various. First, the 
formation of the CU did not lead to substantial decreases in trade barriers on the EU side, as the 
EU had abolished the nominal tariff rates on imports of industrial goods from Turkey long 
before the formation of the CU, namely in 1971. With the formation of the CU certain quotas 
applied by the EU were abolished, but the EU retained the right to impose anti-dumping duties. 
Second, Turkey started to take measures in order to eliminate TBTs only after 2003. Third, 
during the 1990's economic crises began to affect the Turkish economy with increasing 
frequency. Periods of economic expansion have alternated with periods of equally rapid decline. 
Fourth, with substantial decreases in trade barriers on the Turkish side experienced during 1996 
the increase in imports was inevitable as long as it was not accompanied by real devaluation of 
the Turkish Lira. But there was essentially no change in the real exchange rate (RER) during 
1996, and thereafter we observe in fact the appreciation of the RER which has lasted until the 
currency crisis of 2001, when the RER depreciated considerably. Thereafter, the RER started to 
appreciate again stimulating the import growth and hampering the growth of exports and thus 
leading to substantial trade balance deficits. Finally, we note that the appreciation of the euro 
against the US$ lead to increases in the US$ value of EU exports which is then reflected in 
higher US$ trade values of Turkish imports from the EU. 
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
Turkey was not successful in attracting FDI inflows for a very long time. During the period 
1990-1995 annual FDI inflows amounted to only $745 million. The country’s failure to attract 
large foreign investment inflows was mainly due to economic and political uncertainties 
surrounding the country and the enormous institutional, legal and judicial obstacles faced by 
foreign investors in Turkey. Foreign-owned firms had been subject to special authorisations and 
sectoral limitations. According to the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (2001a, 2001b) 
seven major problems impeded the operations of FDI enterprises up until the early 2000s: i) 
Table 3: Foreign Trade, 1990-2009
Total Exports Share of Total Imports Share of 
Exports to the EU-15 Exports to the EU-15 Imports from EU-15 Imports from the EU-15
(million US$) (million US$) in Total Exports (million US$) (million US$) in Total Imports
1990 12,959 7,177 55.38 22,302 9,898 44.38
1991 13,593 7,348 54.05 21,047 9,897 47.02
1992 14,715 7,934 53.92 22,871 10,657 46.59
1993 15,345 7,601 49.53 29,428 13,873 47.14
1994 18,106 8,636 47.70 23,270 10,916 46.91
1995 21,637 11,084 51.22 35,709 16,862 47.22
1996 23,224 11,556 49.76 43,627 23,138 53.04
1997 26,261 12,248 46.64 48,559 24,870 51.22
1998 26,974 13,504 50.06 45,921 24,075 52.43
1999 26,587 14,352 53.98 40,671 21,401 52.62
2000 27,775 14,510 52.24 54,503 26,610 48.82
2001 31,334 16,118 51.44 41,399 18,280 44.16
2002 36,059 18,459 51.19 51,554 23,321 45.24
2003 47,253 24,484 51.82 69,340 31,696 45.71
2004 63,167 32,589 51.59 97,540 42,359 43.43
2005 73,476 35,872 48.82 116,774 45,468 38.94
2006 85,535 40,946 47.87 139,576 50,752 36.36
2007 107,272 50,081 46.69 170,063 58,004 34.11
2008 132,027 51,782 39.22 201,964 63,046 31.22
2009 102,135 39,332 38.51 140,919 47,945 34.02
Source: State Institute of Statistics
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political instability, ii) government hassle, iii) a weak judicial system, (iv) heavy taxation,(v) 
corruption, vi) deficient infrastructure and vii) competition from the informal economy. 
During the period 1996-2000 annual FDI inflows amounted to $846 million. Thus, there was no 
substantial increase in FDI inflows after the formation of the CU. The FDI inflows started to 
increase only after 2001, and reached $20.2 billion in 2006, $22.1 billion in 2007 and $18.3 
billion in 2008. This considerable increase in FDI inflows seems to be due mainly the EU’s 
2004 decision to begin membership negotiations with Turkey, liberalisation measures 
introduced during the period after the 2001 crisis and implementation of the privatisation 
program after 2002.  
Although the investment climate in Turkey has improved considerably over the last seven years, 
the change is still not reflected in various international competitiveness studies such as the 
Doing Business Survey of the World Bank, which in 2010 study ranked Turkey 65th among 183 
countries.35 According to a 2006 study conducted by the OECD's overall FDI regulatory 
restrictiveness index, Turkey's most restrictive sectors were air and maritime transport, followed 
by electricity, and its most liberal sectors are in manufacturing, together with some services 
subsectors such as telecommunications, insurance services and certain business services.36  
Criticism of the Customs Union 
The EU-Turkey CU has not been without its critics. The policy stakeholders emphasise, as 
pointed out by Akman (2010), the following problems: i) The EU’s trade partners that had 
concluded FTAs with the EU or continue to negotiate FTAs with the EU refrain from 
concluding FTAs with Turkey despite the ‘Turkey Clause’ included in FTAs concluded by the 
EU. ii) There are asymmetric effects in trade agreements concluded by the EU and Turkey. In 
particular, Turkey cannot negotiate FTAs with third counties on similar terms like the EU did. 
iii) There are latecomer effects. In particular, Turkey can conclude FTAs only after the EU has 
concluded the FTAs. As a result the FTA with Turkey is concluded usually after a couple of 
years after the conclusion of the FTA with the EU. This puts Turkish exporters into 
disadvantageous position with regards to EU exporters, who can obtain preferential status by 
penetrating into third country markets several years earlier. iv) Turkey suffers tariff revenue 
losses. In particular, imports from third countries by way of trade deflection via the EU induce 
tariff revenue losses for Turkey, an issue that has not received sufficient attention in the customs 
modernisation process. v) The EU has its own priorities reflected in its FTAs that are concluded, 
and these agreements do not take into account Turkey’s special interests. vi) Turkey cannot 
enter into FTAs with third countries with which the EU has not accorded a deal.  
10. Conclusions 
The EU-Turkey Customs Union of 1995 has been a major instrument of integration into the EU 
and global markets, offering powerful tools to reform the Turkish economy. It has credibly 
locked Turkey into a liberal foreign trade regime for industrial goods and holds a promise of 
Turkey’s participation in the EU internal market for industrial products. As a result, Turkish 
producers of industrial goods have become exposed to competition from imports and they 
operate in one of the largest free trade areas, if not the largest, for industrial products in the 
world. They are now protected by tariffs from external competition to exactly the same extent as 
EU producers are and as such face competition from duty-free imports of industrial goods from 
world-class pan-European firms. In return, Turkish industrial producers have duty-free market 
access to the European Economic Area (EU-27 and EFTA). 
                                                     
35 See World Bank (2010). 
36 See OECD (2006). 
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Fifteen years have passed since the formation of the EU-Turkey CU. Fulfilling the requirements 
of the CU has been quite challenging. Turkey has introduced major reforms. But it has faced 
difficulties in fulfilling the requirements of the CU in particular when trying to eliminate the 
TBTs in trade with the EU, adopting and implementing the EU’s competition policy provisions 
on state aid and insuring adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights. In 
those cases, the process of fulfilling the requirements of the CU even after 15 years is not 
complete.  
One lesson that one can derive from the Turkish experience is that trade liberalisation achieved 
through a preferential trade agreement such as the EU-Turkey CU can successfully move the 
economy from a government-controlled regime to a market-based one. Another issue is related 
to the existence of political will on the side of policy-makers to reform the economy. In Turkey 
there was political will to achieve the goal of EU economic integration on the path to becoming 
a full member of the EU. As a result, Turkey – besides opening up its markets to industrial 
goods imports from the EU, accepting the EC’s CCT and adopting all of the preferential 
agreements the EU has concluded with third countries – has also accepted the EU’s custom 
provisions, the EU’s harmonisation approach for the elimination of TBTs, the EU’s competition 
policy, the EU’s intellectual property rights acquis and the EU’s commercial policy regulations. 
Although the administrative costs of implementing the requirements of the CU have been quite 
substantial, it has incurred these costs with the hope of becoming a full member of the EU. 
Moreover, there was almost no resistance to the integration process on the part of Turkish 
public. 
Other countries may not have the prospect of EU membership, but those countries may still be 
interested in integrating with the EU in order to achieve a relatively high but sustainable 
economic growth measured by growth in real per capita income. In such a case, the country 
could try to sign an FTA with the EU, but adopt, as emphasised by Messerlin et al. (2011), only 
those policies of the EU that may be termed pro-growth.  
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